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Abstract
By allowing large classes of movable asstes to be used as collateral, the Property Law 
reform transformed the secured transactions in China. Difference-in-differences test show 
fi rms operating with ex-ante more movable assets expand access to bank credit and 
prolong debt maturity. However, the reform does not seem to improve the effi ciency of 
credit allocation, as debt capacity of ex-ante low quality fi rms expands the most following 
the reform. Credit expansion also does not lead to better fi rm performance. These fi ndings 
are not driven by confounding factors such as improvements in creditor and property rights 
protection. Our results also cannot be explained by other important reforms which were 
introduced around the same time as the introduction of the Property Law. These include 
anti-tunneling and split-share reforms and amendments to the corporate tax structure in 
China. We conduct explicit robustness tests for these other reforms and hence contribute 
to the empirical literature on the reform process in China with new fi ndings.
Keywords: Collateral, movable assets, leverage, property law.
JEL classifi cation: G21, G28, G32, K22.
Resumen
La reforma de la Ley de Propiedad transformó las transacciones aseguradas en China al 
permitir la utilización como garantías de una amplia clase de activos movibles. A través 
del método de «Diferencias en diferencias» se prueba que las compañías que operaban 
ex ante con más activos movibles expanden su acceso al crédito bancario e incrementan 
el vencimiento de su deuda. Sin embargo, no hay indicios de que la reforma mejore la 
efi ciencia en la asignación del crédito, ya que la capacidad de endeudamiento de las 
empresas que son ex ante de baja calidad es la que más se amplía tras la reforma. Además, 
la expansión del crédito tampoco mejora los benefi cios de las compañías. Estos resultados 
no son consecuencia de otros factores, como las mejoras en la protección de los derechos 
de los acreedores y de los derechos de propiedad. Nuestros resultados tampoco son 
consecuencia de otras importantes reformas contemporáneas a la aprobación de la 
reforma de la Ley de Propiedad. Estas incluyen reformas anti tunneling y de desdoblamiento 
de acciones y enmiendas a la estructura fi scal empresarial en China. También se realizan 
pruebas de robustez para estas otras reformas, contribuyendo con nuevos resultados a la 
literatura empírica sobre el proceso reformatorio en China. 
Palabras clave: Garantías, activos movibles, apalancamiento, Ley de Propiedad.  
Códigos JEL: G21, G28, G32, K22.
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1. Introduction 
 
Collateral is central in the law and finance literature. Various theories and empirical studies 
highlight the links between enforceability of secured contracts and access to external finance 
(e.g. Calomiris, Larrain, Liberti and Sturgess, 2015; Haselmann, Pistor and Vig, 2009; 
Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee and Visaria, 2012; Vig, 2013), and the availability of collateral 
and debt capacity in the presence of contract incompleteness (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1982; 
Hart and Moore, 1994). Studies find that the lack of sufficient collateral is a key obstacle to 
access to external finance across countries. The problem is aggravated in countries with weak 
collateral laws, because inadequate legal infrastructure excludes important asset types, for 
instance, movable assets, from permissible collateral classes. On the other hand, legal reforms 
on collateral law also have a dark side: banks may rely excessively on collateral and reduce 
incentives for adequate screening, consequently allowing riskier borrowers to obtain loans and 
worsening credit allocation efficiency (Manove, Padilla and Pagano, 2001; Zazzaro, 2005; 
Jappelli, Pagano and Bianco, 2005).  
In this paper, we provide new evidence from China on how legal reform on permissible 
collateral affects firms’ access to bank credit, credit allocation and firm performance. An 
investigation in the Chinese context is fruitful given the distinct features of the Chinese banking 
sector: firstly banks are not fully commercialized yet and bank lending is often compromised 
by state intervention, and secondly, legal institutions are generally perceived as weak and 
inefficient, hence credit allocation is affected by both informal and formal institutions. Under 
these circumstances, it is a priori unclear whether legal reforms could effectively promote firms’ 
access to finance and improve credit allocation efficiency. The answers to these questions may 
also provide new perspectives for understanding the accumulation of non-performance loans 
and the on-going debate on deleveraging in China.  
To address these issues, we take advantage of the introduction of the Chinese Property 
Law in the end of 2006, which expanded the contracting space in secured transactions by 
allowing large classes of movable assets as permissible collateral. Before the Property Law, 
secured transactions were governed by the 1995 Security Law, which restricted the scope of 
permissible collateral to immovable assets (e.g. land and buildings) and a small class of 
movable assets (e.g. equipment and motor vehicles). Other important asset classes such as 
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accounts receivable and inventory were ether excluded from the pool of permissible collateral 
or allowed only by way of possessory security interests. The Property Law removed these 
restrictions by allowing a broad class of movable assets as permissible collateral (see section 
2). Moreover, accompanying the new law, a centralized electronic registration system was also 
established to facilitate a more easy creation of secured interests.  
As the Property Law reform only pertains to movable assets, it should affect more the 
firms with intensive use of these assets. This policy wrinkle allows for an investigation in a 
difference-in-differences framework, which is ideal for such a quasi-experimental setting, 
because it eliminates observed and unobserved factors that affect treated and untreated firms 
alike (see e.g. Roberts and Whited, 2013). Specifically in this context, the effect of the Property 
Law is identified by comparing the responses of firms that ex-ante rely more on movable assets 
(high movable firms) with those of firms that rely less on movable assets (low movable firms).  
Using a sample of listed firms from China during 2001-2011, we establish several main 
findings. Firstly, allowing movable assets as collateral expanded borrowers’ access to formal 
finance, and prolonged debt maturity. Compared to low movable firms (control group), high 
movable firms (treated group) experienced a relative increase in both total leverage and long-
term leverage after the reform. These changes are economically significant: for instance, long-
term leverage increased by 4.8% more for high movable firms, amounting to 40% of the sample 
mean. In contrast, short-term leverage did not show differential changes for high movable and 
low movable firms. However, we also find such credit expansion was mainly driven by ex-ante 
low quality firms, indicating inefficiency in credit allocation. This evidence is consistent with 
the theoretical models of Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001), Zazzaro (2005), and Jappelli, 
Pagano and Bianco (2005), that legal reforms which improve the value of collateral ease firms’ 
credit constraints, but at the same time, these reforms create incentives for banks to screen 
inadequately and rely excessively on collateral, consequently worsen the efficiency of credit 
allocation.  
Changes in capital structure due to the legal reform is also accompanied by changes in 
asset structure. We find high movable firms increased more in size relative to low movable 
firms, and such change was mainly driven by more fixed asset investments. Specifically, Fixed 
assets of high movable firms increased by 7.6% more than those of low movable firms, a highly 
economically significant result, as it amounts to 24% of sample average. These findings 
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together with previous evidence that firms extended their debt maturity is consistent with the 
view that firms may have employed the extra credit to match asset and debt maturity (e.g. 
Myers, 1977; Milbradt and Oehmke, 2014). Finally, we do not find evidence that firm 
performance experienced differential changes across high and low movable firms after the 
Property Law.  
These results are obtained controlling for firm and year fixed effects, which capture 
systematic differences across firms and general time trends. These effects are also independent 
from industry (provincial) time-varying shocks, because we control explicitly for fixed effects 
interaction terms between industry (provincial) and year. In addition, we validate the parallel 
trend assumption by investigating whether our findings persist for placebo reforms, which is a 
crucial assumption for the difference-in-differences framework. Nevertheless, other 
confounding factors could provide alternative explanations to the previous findings. We 
proceed by investigating these possible explanations.  
We first validate other changes brought about by the Property Law, such as 
improvements in creditor rights or property rights protection, are unlikely to drive our 
findings. 2  Secondly, we test if other contemporary reforms could confound our results, 
including: China Securities Regulatory Commission’s (CSRC) new regulations on related-
party transactions and illegal loan guarantees (2005-2006); the split-share reform (2005-2007); 
and the unification of corporate tax rates in 2008. None of the reforms offers an alternative 
explanation of our results. Thirdly, we verify the findings are not caused by differential 
responses to macroeconomic shocks, such as variations in credit conditions, fiscal policy, the 
global financial crisis and changes in collateral values. Finally, a battery of additional tests are 
conducted to ensure the robustness of our findings. Our results are not driven by differences in 
firm characteristics other than movable assets, and are robust to alternative definitions of 
treatment, alternative classifications of moveable assets, and are not sensitive to various 
alternative samples.  
                                                             
2 Berkowitz, Lin and Ma (2015) provide the first analysis on how changes in creditor and property rights protection by the 
Property Law affect firm value.  
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This article is closely related to the literature that investigates how legal reforms on 
collateral affect corporate financial policies. Campello and Larrain (2015) investigate the 
reforms in Eastern Europe that permitted the use of movable assets (e.g. machinery and 
equipments) as collateral, and find that such reforms promoted access to external finance, and 
reallocated assets and employments towards firms with more movable assets. Aretz, Campello 
and Marchica (2015) analyze the reform of the Napolenoic Code in France, and find that 
increased access to collateral – by expanding it to hard assets – increased firms’ debt capacity 
and prolonged debt maturity. Cerqueiro, Ongena and Roszbach (2015) examine legal reform 
in Sweden that reduced the value of collateral (e.g. floating liens). They show that such reform 
reduced debt capacity and shortened debt maturity, and eventually contributed to distortions in 
corporate investment and asset allocation. Love, Martinez Peria and Sandeep (2016) investigate 
the effects of the existence of collateral registries on access to finance across a large number of 
countries.  
We contribute to this literature by providing new evidence from the largest emerging 
This paper is also related to studies examining how enforceability of secured contracts 
affects lending (e.g. Calomiris, Larrain, Liberti and Sturgess, 2015; Haselmann, Pistor and Vig, 
market economy that expanding the space of permissible collateral improves access to external 
finance and prolongs debt maturity. Most previous studies investigate economies characterized 
by a private banking sector, while our study focuses on China, characterized by a semi-efficient 
state-dominant banking sector. The results reported here suggest that even in such an 
environment, legal reforms that target directly the pledgeability of collateral could effectively 
expand firms’ access to formal finance. This finding bears particular importance as China is 
often viewed as a counterexample to established results obtained in the law and finance 
literature, mostly for advanced economies (Allen, Qian and Qian, 2005). Our results also 
reinforce the claim of Haselmann, Pistor and Vig (2009) that effective collateral laws are 
crucial, particularly in emerging markets where information asymmetries are more severe than 
in advanced economies. Additionally, we provide some evidence supporting the notion that 
laws which increase collateral value could hurt the efficiency of credit allocation, possibly 
because banks rely excessively on collateral instead of screening in reducing ex-post credit risk 
(Manove, Padilla and Pagano, 2001; Zazzaro, 2005; Jappelli, Pagano and Bianco, 2005; 
Assuncao, Benmelech and Silva, 2014).  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 11 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1750
2009; Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee and Visaria, 2012; Vig, 2013), and how the collateral 
channel affects capital structure and investment (e.g. Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar, 2012; 
Campello and Giambona, 2013; Cvijanovic, 2014; Gan, 2007; Benmelech, 2009; Kim and 
Kung, 2013). These analyses focus on the value, availability or re-use of assets which have 
been permitted as collateral, while we focus on the permissibility of assets to be used as 
collateral in the first place. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
description of the institutional background governing secured transactions in China. Section 3 
describes identification strategy, data and key variables. Section 4 presents the main results. 
Section 5 discusses various alternative explanations and robustness tests. Finally, Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. The institutional background 
2.1 The Security Law   
Before the enactment of the Property Law in the end of 2006, secured financing was governed 
by the 1995 Security Law. This law specifies certain types of existing movable assets which 
can be pledged as collateral. Non-possessory security interests were allowed only for the use 
of equipment and motor vehicles as collateral (under Article 34 of the Security Law). Other 
movable assets such as accounts receivables, future acquired properties, properties that cannot 
be fixed in type, quantity or location, could not serve as permissible collateral. The Security 
Law did not exclude inventory as permissible collateral; however, it could be used only as 
collateral by way of possessory security interests. In practice, the amount of inventory had to 
be fixed at the time of financing and was required to be relocated (or the ownership certificate 
had to be transferred) to creditors. 
Furthermore, a secured interest had to be registered to be enforceable, while no 
centralized registration system existed. In China, numerous registries dealt with different types 
of collateral, and had ultimate discretion in rejecting or accepting the registration of secured 
interests. Moreover, these registries required collateral to be appraised and the legality of 
security agreements to be certified. As a result, creating and registering secured interests was 
costly, time consuming and subject to uncertainty. Another problem was that the Security Law 
did not provide clear rules on the determination of priority among competing claims on the 
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same collateral. Secured lenders might have to compete with other claimants for underlying 
collateral, which in turn increased the cost of credit.  
The limited permissible asset types and prohibitive process in creating and registering 
secured interest impeded secured transactions using movable assets as collateral. As a result, 
secured transactions strongly favored real property as security when lending to enterprises. 
World Bank Group (2007) shows that less than 7% of loans in China were secured purely by 
movables assets, which were mostly inventories and equipment.3  
 
2.2. The Property Law 
On December 29, 2006, the 5th Session of the 10th Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress (NPC) accepted a draft of the Property Law of the People’s Republic of China. The 
Law was eventually passed on March 16th, 2007 and put into effect on October 1th of that year. 
The Property Law was supplemented by two additional implementation measures: the 
Measures for Chattel Mortgage Registration, issued by the State Administration of Industry 
and Commerce (SAIC); and the Measures for the Registration of Pledged Receivables, issued 
by the People’s Bank of China. The former governs general movable properties while the latter 
governs receivables. These measures together with the Property Law provide detailed guidance 
on the scope of permissible collateral and registration systems for security interests.   
Under the new law, the range of permissible security was greatly expanded, which now 
includes accounts receivables, existing and future production equipment, raw materials, semi-
finished goods and inventories. The registration of security interests is also simplified: for 
general movable assets (except receivables), the registration can be done at the local office of 
the SAIC for the county in which the debtor is domiciled, and it requires only basic information 
about the parties, the debt and the underlying security.  
In addition, specific rules and registration systems are created to guide secured 
transactions in receivables, which are arguably one of the most important movable asset classes. 
Accounts receivables are broadly defined in Chapter 17 of the Property Law as “… the right to 
require payment from debtors arising out of sales of goods, services or facilities, including 
existing and future monetary claims and proceeds, but not including those arising from 
                                                             
3 Source: People’s Bank of China (PBOC)-FIAS-CPDF survey of financial institutions (The “Lender Survey”), p.56.  
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negotiable instruments or other negotiable securities”. The Measure for the Registration of 
Pledged Receivables provides further clarification by listing five types of accounts receivables 
as permissible collateral, including, but not limited, the following: 1) claims from sales; 2) 
claims from leases; 3) claims from rendering services; 4) rights to charge fees from immovable 
property such as toll roads, bridges, tunnels, ferries, etc.; and 5) claims from granting loans or 
other credit. To facilitate the creation of secured interests in accounts receivables, the Credit 
Reference Centre of the People’s Bank of China (Centre) is created as a centralized registration 
authority for the pledging of accounts receivables. The Centre also sets up a search system to 
publicize registration information of the pledge of accounts receivables, which allows lenders 
to obtain information about borrowers or other registered security interests. Apart from 
allowing more permissible collateral and establishing centralized registration systems, the 
Property Law also provides clearer references to the determination of priorities among 
competing claims on the same collateral. Specifically, priority is determined by the date of 
registration of security interests.  
As the result of these legal changes, secured transactions against movable assets have 
expanded greatly. During 2008-2010, the number of loans backed by movable assets increased 
by 21% per year, while the value of loans increased by 24% per year. Since the creation of the 
Credit Reference Centre in 2007, more than 1.7 million receivable-backed loans have been 
recorded by the end of July 2015, or a remarkable annual growth rate of 51%. These loans 
amounted to 57 trillion RMB, among which 30 trillion was given to 220,000 small and 
medium-sized enterprises.4  
                                                             
4 Source: Independent Evaluation of the IFC Secured Transactions Advisory Project in China (2011) and Credit Reference 
Center of People’s Bank of China 
3. Identification strategy and data 
3.1. Identification strategy 
We investigate the causal relationship between the collateral framework and access to finance 
in China using difference-in-differences (DID) method, where we compare corporate leverage 
before and after the enactment of the Property Law as a function of firms’ pre-reform level of 
movable assets. The identification hinges on the fact that the Property Law pertains to movable 
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assets only, and therefore firms with ex-ante higher reliance on movable assets in their 
operations are more affected by this legal change. The difference-in-differences approach 
allows us to control observed and unobserved factors that could affect treaded and control firms 
alike.  
Like any method, the difference-in-differences framework relies on some crucial 
assumptions. Firstly, the pre-reform trends for the treated and control group must be similar, 
that is, the so called parallel trend assumption. We address this issue by investigating placebo 
(non-exist) reforms that took place before the actual passage of the Property Law. If the parallel 
trend assumption holds, we expect to find insignificant differential effects across treated and 
control firms for these placebo reforms. Secondly, our shock, that is the passage of the Property 
Law, needs to be an exogenous event, so that firms could not anticipate the legal reform and 
adjust their asset composition beforehand. Regarding this assumption, we argue it is very 
unlikely that firms could have anticipated the passage of the Property Law, as well as predicting 
precisely the content of the Property Law. According to Zhang (2008), various versions of the 
Property Law were discussed and blocked due to the pressure from the conservatives. The 
Property Law therefore had to be redrafted several times, making it impossible for firms to plan 
their response accordingly since the actual content of the Property Law was unknown 
beforehand. In addition, the several rounds of redrafting and discussion in the People’s 
Congress made the timing of the final passage unpredictable. Specifically, in March 2006, the 
law was withdrawn from the People’s Congress due to strong opposition from conservatives. 
On December 24, 2006, the standing committee of People’s Congress conducted an 
unprecedented seventh reading of the law to discuss its suitability, suggesting that even 5 days 
before its approval, it was still uncertain whether or not the law would pass. And finally, when 
the Property Law was approved on December 29, 2006, it shocked the stock market. Berkowitz, 
Lin, and Ma (2015) found the announcement of the Property Law on December 29, 2006 was 
unexpected by comparing the stock market reaction on the announcement date and the rest of 
the trading days of 2006. These facts provide compelling evidence that the passage of the 
Property Law was unexpected and therefore exogenous to firms. Nevertheless, it is possible 
that some politically connected firms may have inside information about the potential passage 
of the law, and could have changed their asset mix in advance. To further mitigate any potential 
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anticipation effect, we remove observations from 2006 when the Property Law was debated 
and approved by the National People’s Congress.  
As stated above, our identification strategy relies on firms’ ex-ante reliance on movable 
assets, in the sense that firms relied more on movable assets before the reform should be more 
affected by the Property Law. In our main analysis, we define movable assets as the sum of 
Inventory and Accounts Receivable. This classification captures the main groups of the assets 
that were allowed to be pledged as collateral after the reform. Robustness analysis in latter 
section validates our main results are not sensitive to this particular definition of movable assets. 
We scale the level of movable assets by total assets and calculate the movable assets ratio 
Movratio as (Inventoryt+Accounts Receivablet)/Assett. To measure the ex-ante dependence on 
movable assets, we calculate for each firm its pre-reform median movable assets ratio (over 
2001-2005)5. Based on this measure, we then divide firms into three equal sized bins, and 
denote the firms in the highest 33% of movable assets ratio as treated firms, and the firms with 
the lowest 33% as control firms. We expect that firms in the treated group to be affected more 
                                                             
5 Our main results hold if pre-reform movable ratio is defined based on 2005 value instead of median calculated over 2001-
2005. Using median value over pre-reform era avoids the possibility that movable assets could be cyclical in nature.  
by the passage of the Property Law. Specifically, our generalized difference-in-differences 
specification is as follows:6 
 
??? ? ?? ? ?? ? ????????? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
where i indexes for firm and t for accounting year. Yit represents outcomes of interest, including 
for instance various leverage measures defined later. Firm fixed effects ?? control for time-
invariant differences between treatment and control groups, while the time fixed effects ?? 
control for aggregate time-varying shocks. Highmovi is an indicator variable that equals one if 
the firm belongs to the treatment group (i.e. firm located in the top 33% of pre-reform median 
movable ratio) and zero if it belongs to the control group (i.e. firms located in the bottom 33% 
6 ?????? and ???????? do not enter the regression as stand-along variables because they are absorbed by year fixed effects 
and firm fixed effects. 
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of pre-reform median movable ratio). Aftert is a binary variable that takes the value one for the 
years after the Property Law reform (2007-2011), and zero otherwise (2001-2005). We exclude 
observations from 2006 to mitigate concerns on any anticipation effect. X denotes a set of 
control variables including: Sizeit-1,7 Tangibilityit-1, Liquidityit-1, Profitabilityit-1, Saleit-1, Ageit-1, 
Listit, Splitit and Stateit. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, most of these controls enter the 
model with lagged values. ???  is the error term. Following Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 
(2004), standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The difference-in-differences estimator 
is ?, which measures the pre-post difference in the outcome of interest of firms with a high 
movable ratio, relative to the pre-post difference of firms with a low movable ratio.  
One concern with this specification is that some industry specific shocks occurred 
around the enactment of the law, and these industries have higher movable asset ratio. To 
address this issue, the baseline specification is augmented with Industry-Year fixed effects to 
7 Our results remain unchanged if we control firm size by size dummies, which allows for possible non-linear effects of firm 
size on debt maturity, as in Gopalan, Mukherjee and Singh (2015). 
                                                             
control for time-varying industry specific shocks. Similarly, Province-Year fixed effects are 
included to control for time-varying regional economic shocks. Section 5 discusses further the 
robustness of the main specification. 
 
 
3.2. Data and key variables 
Our sample is composed of firms listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange covering 2001-2011. As required by China Stock Regulatory Committee, listed firms 
report regularly detailed balance sheet and income statement information. We obtain these data 
from a database called WIND Information. This database also provides information of listed 
firms such as industry classification, location, established year, listed year and ownership type, 
etc. Crucially it also contains a detailed breakdown of firms’ liabilities, including information 
on total debt, long-term debt, short-term debt, and detailed breakdowns of asset categories.8 
We exclude firms from financial industries and firms with missing values in total assets. As 
8 Unfortunately, both WIND Information, and another popular financial database CSMAR, lack detailed information on secured 
and unsecured debt.  
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discussed before, we also exclude observations from 2006 in order to mitigate concerns of any 
anticipation effect. In addition, in order to be qualified for inclusion in the sample, firms are 
required to have annual reports both before and after 2006. In total, our whole sample contains 
more than 12,000 firm-year observations from around 1200 firms, and covers 58 industries. 
The sample is also well-represented geographically, as it includes firms located from all 31 
provinces of mainland China.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the key variables. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99%, and all real variables are inflation adjusted. Table 1 (Panel A) shows 
that the average Movratio is 26%. A decomposition of movable assets shows that inventory 
represents 17% of total assets, while accounts receivable accounts for 9% of total assets. In 
section 5, we shall use an alternative definition of the movable ratio as a robustness check, 
which defines this ratio as (CurrentAssett-Casht)/Assett. This broader definition captures the 
fact that all movable assets that are not explicitly prohibited by the Property Law are allowed 
to be pledged as collateral, such as raw material and future equipment. The average 
(CurrentAssett-Casht)/Assett is 37%. All in all, these figures suggest that movable assets are an 
important asset category. Hence, should these assets be allowed as collateral (as has been 
permitted by the Property Law), potentially it could change the landscape of secured borrowing 
in China.  
Panel B provides the summary statistics on the liabilities side. Total firm leverage is 
defined as the ratio of debt over lagged assets (Debtt/Assett-1), where Debtt is the sum of long- 
term debt (LongDebtt) and short-term debt (ShortDebtt).9 The average Debtt/Assett-1 is 0.33, 
with a standard deviation of 0.22. Total leverage is further decomposed into long-term leverage 
(LongDebtt/Assett-1) and short-term leverage (ShortDebtt/Assett-1). Average long-term leverage 
is 0.12, while that of short-term leverage is 0.19. These figures suggest that the majority of 
corporate debt of these listed firms is short-term.   
Panel C reports the summary statistics on the assets side and profitability. The mean 
value of Log(1+Assett) is 21.25, which translates to an average firm book value around RMB 
1,600 million. Average firm net profitability (Netprofitt/Assett-1) is 3.5%. Finally, Panel D 
                                                             
9 Short-term debt is debt that matures within one year, while long-term debt is debt with a maturity longer than one year.  
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describes briefly the control variables employed in the analysis. Tangibility is defined as the 
ratio of fixed assets to total assets (FixedAssett/Assett). Average tangibility is 0.29. Liquidity is 
defined as cash divided by total assets (Casht/Assett). Average liquidity is 0.16. Profitability is 
defined as the ratio of net profits over total assets (Netprofitt/Assett). Sale is the logarithm of 
one plus total sales. Age is defined as the logarithm of one plus the number of years since the 
incorporation of the firm. The average age is 11 years. List is a dummy variable that equals one 
for firm-year observations after the firm’s IPO, and zero otherwise. Split is a dummy variable 
that equals one for firm-year observations after a firm’s completion of the split-share reform 
(discussed later), and zero otherwise. State is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
controlling shareholder is the government and zero if the controlling shareholder is a private 
entity.   
 
 
4. Results 
This section presents the main results. In section 4.1, we report the effects of the Property Law 
reform on corporate leverage and debt maturity. Next, we discuss whether the reform improved 
the efficiency of credit allocation in section 4.2. Section 4.3 investigates the real effects of the 
Property Law reform, such as its impact on asset structure and firm performance.  
   
4.1. Debt and debt maturity 
This section examines the effect of the Property Law on corporate leverage and debt maturity 
by estimating specification (1). Table 2 presents the results. The coefficient of interest is on 
Highmovi*Aftert, which measures the differential effects of the Property Law across firms with 
high and low pre-reform movable assets. Column (1) examines the effect of the law on total 
leverage, using Debtt/Assett-1 as outcome variable. The coefficient of interest is 0.069 and 
statistically significant at 1%. Given that the average leverage ratio is 0.33 in our sample, this 
result suggests that in relative terms high movable firms increase leverage ratio by 21% more 
than for low movable firms. Columns (2) to (3) investigate if the Property Law changed the 
debt maturity structure. In column (2), long-term leverage (LongDebtt/Assett-1) for high 
movable firms increased in relative terms by 4.8% more than for low movable firms, and this 
effect is also statistically significant at 1%. The economic implication is also significant: a 4.8% 
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increase represents 40% of the sample mean. In contrast, short-term leverage 
(ShortDebtt/Assett-1) in column (3) does not show differential changes between the two types 
of firms. The DID estimator is 0.009 and statistically insignificant. In unreported tests we 
obtain similar findings when using level of debt instead of leverage as dependent variables, 
which rules out the possibility that our results are driven by the variations in the denominator 
(i.e. total assets).  
These findings are consistent with our hypothesis that better collateral law that permits 
movable assets as collateral improves firms’ access to bank credit. However, somewhat 
surprising is that short-term leverage does not experience relative changes after the enactment 
of the Property Law. Indeed, as suggested by columns (1) and (2), the observed relative 
increases in total leverage is driven entirely by the increases in the long-term leverage. These 
findings are counterintuitive because short-term debt, if secured, is more likely to be secured 
by movable assets, and consequently, a legal act that allows more short-term assets to be 
pledgable should improve mostly firms’ access to short-term bank credit. One possible 
explanation is that for listed firms in China, short-term debt is less likely to be secured when 
compared to long-term debt, and therefore, the effects of the Property Law on short term 
borrowing are less pronounced.10 As will be discussed in latter section, the expansion in long-
term leverage is accompanied by the increases in firms’ fixed assets investment, indicating that 
firms have the tendency to match their debt and asset maturity.     
One might suspect that movable assets could be positively related to corporate leverage 
for reasons other than the pledgability of collateral. For instance, it is possible that firm with 
more outstanding accounts receivable or more inventory in the past needed to borrow more to 
keep the company afloat. This argument would imply a positive correlation between the 
movable assets ratio and leverage at any given point of time. To explore this possibility, we 
repeat our analysis in columns (4)-(9) for several placebo reforms that happened in years before 
the actual reform. Since we use lagged control variables and we need at least one year of 
observation before and after the placebo reforms, we could design two placebo reforms 
                                                             
10 Diamond (1991) provides theoretical arguments that short-term debt is less likely to be collateralized than long-term debt.  
Xu, Van Rixel and Wang (2015) provide loan-level evidence that the likelihood of pledging collateral increases with loan 
maturity in China. 
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occurring in 2003 and 2004, respectively. In all these tests, Aftert is an indicator variable takes 
value one for years after the placebo reform, and Highmovi is calculated based on median 
movable assets ratio measured before each placebo reform. In all the placebo reforms, the 
coefficients on Highmovi*Aftert are statistically insignificant and economically small compared 
to the baseline model, indicating no differential effects across firms with high and low level of 
movable assets before the actual reform. These results rule out the alternative explanation 
stated above. In addition, these placebo reforms provide validation for the parallel trend 
assumption, which is crucial for the DID framework. 
 
4.2. The efficiency of credit allocation 
Having established that the Property Law reform promoted access to bank finance, this section 
investigates if the reform improved the efficiency of credit allocation in China. The answer to 
this question is very important as credit misallocation in China caused significant losses to 
aggregate output (e.g. Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). Under the assumption that collateral is usually 
associated with low quality borrowers (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1990, 1995; Jimenez, Salas and 
Saurina, 2006), a reform that expands permissible collateral should improve the most the debt 
capacity of these borrowers. This is because high quality borrowers may access unsecured 
loans, while low quality borrowers cannot borrow unless the loan is secured. Furthermore, 
because providing collateral may reduce banks’ incentives to screen borrowers adequately 
(Manove, Padilla and Pagano, 2001), this could allow more low quality firms with movable 
assets to apply for loans. These arguments suggest that the impact of the Property Law on debt 
capacity should be more pronounced among low quality firms, and consequently worsen the 
efficiency of credit allocation.  
To investigate this hypothesis, we expand the baseline specification with a triple 
interaction term to test whether low quality firms with more movable assets expanded more 
access to bank credit. We apply a set of ex-ante firm quality proxies Q, including: return on 
sales (ROS), indebtedness (Liability Ratio), and Altman’s Z-score. Each proxy is measured at 
the pre-reform median. The baseline specification (1) is then re-estimated after incorporating 
the triple interaction terms, with Debtt/Assett-1 as the dependent variable.  
Table 3 reports results. Consistent with the previous conjecture, the differential increase 
in Debtt/Assett-1 is mainly driven by low quality firms. For instance, in column (1) the 
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coefficient on the triple interaction term Highmovi*Aftert*PreRosi is statistically negative, 
indicating that relative credit expansion for high movable firms is less pronounced for firms 
with higher pre-reform return on sales. In column (2), the positive coefficient on 
Highmovi*Aftert*PreLiabilityi implies that the relative credit expansion for high movable firms 
is driven by firms that had been highly indebted before the introduction of the law. Column (3) 
examines whether firms that are prone to bankruptcy, measured by Altman’s Z-scores, 
experienced larger increase in their debt capacity. The negative coefficient on the triple 
interaction term Highmovi*Aftert*PreZscorei suggests that firms with higher pre-reform Z-
scores, that is firms less prone to bankruptcy, expanded less in their debt capacity.  
Overall, these findings indicate that after the introduction of the Property Law, firms 
that were less profitable, highly indebted, or prone to bankruptcy expanded the most their debt 
capacity. This implies that although the Property Law reform relaxed credit constraints, it did 
not improve the efficiency of credit allocation in China, as the extra credit was mostly allocated 
to ex-ante low quality firms. Similar findings are reported by Assuncao, Benmelech and Silva 
(2014), which finds that a legal reform in Brazil eased the resale of repossessed cars, eventually 
allowing for riskier borrowers to obtain loans. One possibility for this finding could be related 
to banks’ reduced incentives to screen borrower adequately once more collateral becomes 
available, or if the repossession of collateral becomes easier (Manove, Padilla and Pagano, 
2001; Zazzaro, 2005; Jappelli, Pagano and Bianco, 2005). However, we do not have data on 
banks’ screening activities before and after the Property Law to test this conjecture. We leave 
it for future research.   
 
4.3. Asset structure and profitability 
This section investigates if firms change their asset structure following the Property Law 
reform, and if the reform improves the profitability of firms. Results are obtained by estimating 
specification (1) using Log(1+Assett), FixedAssett/Assett-1, and Netprofitst/Assett-1 as dependent 
variables, respectively. All specifications include Industry*Year, and Province*Year fixed 
effects to exclude possible confounding factors driven by industrial or provincial specific time 
varying shocks.  
Table 4 reports results. Looking at the estimates in column (1), we find that high 
moveable firms experienced relative increase in total assets, as suggested by the statistically 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 22 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1750
significant coefficient on the interaction term. Column (2) indicates that Fixed Assett/Total 
Assett-1 of high movable firms increased by 7.6% more than for low movable firms, which is 
highly economically significant as it amounts to amounts to 24% of sample average. In 
unreported tests, we find this pattern persists using Log(1+FixedAssett) as dependent variable, 
validating that the results in the other columns are not caused by changes in the scaling variable.  
Finally, column (3) investigates whether high movable firms experienced relative 
improvements in their profitability after the reform. The interaction term is statistically 
insignificant and economically small, suggesting no differential changes in the profitability of 
firms across high and low movable firms after the reform. As before, for each dependent 
variable we check the parallel trend assumption by investigating placebo reforms that took 
place in 2003 and 2004. Results are reported in columns (4)-(9). In all these columns, the 
coefficients on the interaction term are small and statistically insignificant, validating that the 
parallel trend assumption holds.  
Taken together, these results suggest that firms adjusted their asset composition towards 
longer maturity in terms of more fixed asset investments, but the shifts in asset and debt 
compositions did not seem to affect profitability. Since high movable firms usually have low 
                                                             
11 See Gopalan, Mukherjee and Singh (2015) for similar findings. They find that better contract enforcement allows firms to 
better match debt and asset maturity.  
levels of tangible assets, our findings imply that firms achieved more balanced asset structures 
following the reform. This result is in line with the notion that firms match the maturity of 
assets and liabilities (e.g. Myers, 1977; Milbradt and Oehmke, 2014): the evidence shows that 
firms with relatively large amounts of short-term assets (or the high movable firms in this paper) 
experienced disproportional increases in both long-term debt (section 4.1) and long-term assets 
(fixed assets). 11  Our findings also lend some support to “credit multiplier” effects (e.g. 
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 2000; Campello and Hackbarth, 2012): higher external finance 
promotes more investments in fixed assets, which in turn could be used as collateral to further 
increase the debt capacity of these firms. 
 
5. Validity and robustness 
This section investigates if confounding factors could refute the previous findings, including: 
the creditor rights and property rights protection aspects of the Property Law (5.1); other 
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contemporary reforms (5.2); and macroeconomic shocks (5.3). Additional robustness tests are 
discussed in section (5.4). For the sake of brevity, from this section onwards, only results for 
total leverage (Debtt/Assett-1), long-term leverage (LongDebtt/Assett-1), and short-term leverage 
(ShortDebtt/Assett-1) are presented.  
 
5.1. Creditor rights and property rights protection 
The Property Law not only broadened the scope of assets that could be pledged as collateral, it 
also improved the protection of creditor rights and property rights, at least in theory. It is 
therefore crucial to check if these “side effects” are the main drivers of the previous findings.  
 
5.1.1. Creditor rights protection  
The Property Law has improved creditor rights protection substantially. Various articles of the 
Property Law give creditors more power to protect the value of underlying collateral; prevent 
misusage of secured assets and entitle creditors to order debtors to restore the value of secured 
assets due to depreciation; and allow creditors to seize secured assets in times of default.12 
These changes could have profound consequences for corporate debt structure. On the one 
hand, creditors might supply more credit if secured contracts are enforceable (e.g. Haselmann, 
Pistor and Vig, 2010; Visaria, 2009). On the other hand, excessive creditor rights protection 
may also introduce pre-mature liquidation bias, resulting in less demand for secured debt, total 
debt and shorter debt maturity (e.g. Vig, 2013).  
If creditor rights protection drives the previous results, it should post differential 
impacts on high movable and low movable firms. One possibility is that fixed assets are easier 
to be evaluated and monitored relative to movable assets, and hence, should default occur, are 
easier to be ceased by creditors (Vig, 2013; Gopalan, Mukherjee and Singh, 2015). 
Consequently, stronger creditor rights protection could affect more firms that ex-ante operate 
with more fixed assets, which are also potentially low movable firms.  
To test for the effect of creditor rights protection, we expand specification (1) with an 
interaction term Ftani*Aftert, where Ftani is a continuous variable that equals firm i’s pre-
reform median tangibility. Higher value of Ftani implies that firm operates ex-ante with high 
                                                             
12 Berkowitz, Lin and Ma (2015) provide an excellent summary of various Articles of the Property Law that strengthen creditor 
rights protection.  
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levels of fixed assets, and potentially is more sensitive to the strengthening of creditor rights 
protection. Consequently, if better creditor rights protection is driving the results, the 
coefficient on Ftani*Aftert should be positive and the coefficient on Highmovi*Aftert should 
become insignificant. Table 5 columns (1)-(3) report the results. The coefficient on Ftani*Aftert 
is -0.056 in column (1) and statistically insignificant, suggesting no differential impacts of 
creditor rights protection on total leverage. LongDebtt/Assett-1 decreases relatively more for 
firms with more tangible assets (column (2), Ftani*Aftert=-0.128***), while the pattern 
reverses for ShortDebtt/Assett-1 (column (3), Ftani*Aftert =0.119***). This result implies that 
firms operating ex-ante with high levels of fixed assets substitute long-term debt for short-term 
debt after the reform, which is consistent with the notion that stronger creditor rights reduce 
debt maturity (see e.g. Vig, 2013). But more importantly, controlling for the differential effects 
of creditor rights protection does not lead to significant changes in the coefficients on 
Highmovi*Aftert, rejecting the alternative explanation that better creditor rights protection is 
the main cause for our previous findings.13  
 
5.1.2. Property rights protection  
A second “side effect” is the improvement in property rights protection. The Property Law 
recognized explicitly the equal protection of private and public properties for the first time, and 
provided provisions to limit the expropriation of private assets.14 At least on paper, the new 
law may have improved property rights protection. Better property rights protection affects 
accessibility to external finance and real outcomes in at least two ways. Firstly, lenders extend 
more credit and firms invest more if the underlying collateral is unlikely to be expropriated by 
government (e.g. De Soto, 2001; Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar, 2012). Secondly, lower 
expropriation risks reduce uncertainty, which improves firm value and profitability, promotes 
investment and increases debt capacity (e.g. Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; Besley, 1995).  
Ideally, if the improvements in property rights protection are similar for high movable 
and low movable firms, such effects will be differenced out in the DID framework. 
Nevertheless, a valid concern is that firms with a high share of movable assets benefit 
                                                             
13 It’s extremely hard to fully differentiate the effects of creditor rights protection from that of the expansion of permissible 
collateral types, because secured lending relies on creditor rights protection.    
14 See for instance Berkowitz, Lin and Ma (2015) and Zhang (2008) for description of the pre-reform property rights protection 
and various Articles of the Property Law on improving property rights protection.    
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disproportionally more from better property rights protection, because movable assets are 
easier to be expropriated.  
This issue is addressed in three ways. The first method explores the heterogeneous 
improvements in property rights protection for different types of firms. In general, private firms 
should benefit the most from the improvements in property rights protection (Berkowitz, Lin, 
and Ma, 2015), while state-owned firms should benefit less because they are well protected (or 
without well-defined property rights), both before and after the Property Law enactment. 
Therefore, we augment specification (1) with Privateit and an interaction term Privateit*Aftert 
to capture the differential impacts of property rights protection, where Privateit is a dummy that 
equals one if firm i’s controlling shareholder is a private entity at time t, and zero otherwise.15 
If better property rights protection improves access to finance, the coefficient on 
Privateit*Aftert is expected to be positive. Columns (4)-(6) of Table 5 report the results. In 
column (4) and (5), the coefficients on Privateit*Aftert are statistically insignificant, suggesting 
that private firms, i.e. firms with worse property rights protection, do not experience relative 
changes in total leverage and long-term leverage. With respect to short-term leverage, column 
(6) indicates that private firms experienced a relative decrease compared to state-owned firms 
after the reform, contradicting the property rights protection hypothesis. Importantly, after 
controlling for the differential impacts of property rights protection, the coefficients on 
Highmovi*Aftert for all debt measures are almost identical to that of the baseline model in Table 
2.16  
The second method explores the ex-ante cross-sectional variation on property rights 
protection at the provincial level.17 If lower expropriation risks promote access to finance, one 
would expect the effect to be stronger for firms located in provinces with high pre-reform 
expropriation risks. Following Berkowitz, Lin and Ma (2015), we employ the Producer 
Protection Index of Fan, Wang and Wu (2010) to measure expropriation risks at the provincial 
                                                             
15 To control for the possible confounding factor of privatization, the baseline model is re-estimated on a sample of firms that 
never changed their ownership type throughout the entire sample period. Results remain similar. As another robustness check, 
firm ownership is re-defined based on the ownership type in 2005 instead of using a time-varying definition. This definition 
avoids the possibility that firm ownership is endogenous to the Property Law reform. Results remain similar.  
16 Test including both Ftani*Aftert and Privateit*Aftert in specification (1) are conducted but not reported. The assumption of 
this test is that firms with more fixed assets benefit disproportionally more from better property rights protection, i.e. through 
the collateral channel (see e.g. Berkowitz, Lin and Ma, 2015). This test does not change the coefficients on Highmovi*Aftert, 
nor does it affect the coefficients on either Ftani*Aftert or Privateit*Aftert. Results are available upon request.  
17 For this test, we exclude Province*Time fixed effects because including it would absorb the provincial property rights 
protection measure.  
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level. 18  Higher values of this index imply better property rights protection, hence less 
expropriation risks. Specification (1) is augmented with an interaction term Protecti*Aftert to 
capture the differential effects of property rights protection, where Protecti is a continuous 
variable that equals the pre-reform median producer protection index of the province where the 
firm locates. For this test, standard errors are clustered at the provincial level.19 As reported in 
Table 5, columns (7) to (9), the coefficients on Protecti*Aftert are negative and statistically 
insignificant for all debt measures. Adding Protecti*Aftert also does not affect neither the 
economic magnitudes nor the statistical significance of the coefficients on Highmovi*Aftert for 
all regressions.  
Lastly, we re-estimated specification (1) on a sample of state-owned firms. This sample 
offers a relatively clean identification of the causal relationship between permissible collateral 
and access to finance. This is because state-owned firms are less likely to suffer from pre-
mature liquidation risks (due to soft budget constraints and implicit guarantees from 
government), and their level of property rights protection will not change substantially after 
the Property Law. To avoid potential confounding factors resulting from changes in ownership, 
only firms that remained state-owned throughout the entire sample period are included in this 
sample. Results in columns (10) to (12) of Table 5 show that the coefficients on 
Highmovi*Aftert are largely consistent with the results for the full sample. Taken together, these 
results suggest that better property rights protection is unlikely to be the key driver of our 
previous findings. 
 
5.2. Other contemporary reforms 
This section tests whether other contemporary reforms (policies) can confound the previous 
results, including: “tunneling reforms”20 (i.e. new regulations enacted by the China Securities 
                                                             
18 Another property rights protection index- Reduce Government Expropriation Index- is also employed as a robustness check. 
Similar results are obtained using this index. Results are available upon request. 
19 Clustering standard errors at the firm level does not change the results.  
20 Tunneling is an activity involving the extraction of firm value by controlling shareholders or managers (see e.g. Johnson, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Zamarripa, 2003). 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) on related-party transactions and illegal loan guarantees 
(2005-2006)); the split-share reform (2005-2007); and unification of corporate tax rates (2008).  
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5.2.1. Tunneling reforms  
Chinese listed firms have been plagued with tunneling activities (Jiang, Lee and Yue, 2010). 
During 2005 and 2006, the State Council and CSRC issued several statements to tackle 
tunneling activities, including joint statements by eight ministries threatening to take personal 
actions against top managers of controlling entities if the tunneling problem would not be 
resolved by the end of 2006. 21  According to many observers, these strict rules have 
successfully reduced tunneling activities (e.g. Jiang, Lee and Yue, 2010; Li et al., 2015). As 
demonstrated in Jiang, Lee and Yue (2010), one of the most common ways to tunnel corporate 
assets is through inter-corporate lending to controlling shareholders and their affiliates. These 
transactions are registered under the entry “Other Receivables” (OREC), which represent on 
average 4% of total assets in our sample (see Table 1). Given the possibility that firms with 
more movable assets also have more other receivables, it very likely that high movable firms 
are prone to tunneling activities. Hence, even if the Property Law would not have been 
introduced, changes in the debt structure resulting from the anti-tunneling regulations enacted 
in 2005 and 2006 would be different for high and low movable firms.  
Following Jiang, Lee and Yue (2010), we employ other receivables ratio (Other 
Receivablest/Assett) is as proxy of tunneling risk. We augment the baseline model (1) with the 
interaction term Foreci*Tunnelt to capture the differential effects of the “tunneling reforms”, 
where Foreci is a continuous measure that equals firm’s pre-reform median other receivables 
ratio, with higher value indicating higher possibility to tunnel activates. Tunnelt is a dummy 
21 Several failed attempts in regulating tunneling activities took effect in early 2000. Eventually, in November 2005, the State 
Council issued a Directive on behalf of the CSRC, titled “ On improving the Quality of Listed Companies”, which states that 
the top management of controlling shareholders or colluding firms will be personally punished for tunneling activities. In 
November 2006, eight government ministries issued a joint announcement, making it clear that the top management of 
controlling entities will be fired and face disciplinary punishment if tunneling activities remain in place by December 31, 2006. 
See Jiang, Lee and Yue (2010) and Li et al. (2015) for more details. 
that equals one for 2005-2011 and zero otherwise. If the reduction in tunneling activities is the 
sole explanation for our results, the coefficient on Highmovi*Aftert would lose its significance 
once controlled for the interaction term Foreci*Tunnelt.   
Table 6 (columns (1) to (3)) reports the results. Firm leverage decreases relatively more 
for firms that are prone to tunneling risks after the tunneling reform (column (1), 
Foreci*Tunnelt= -0.311*), and such relative decrease in total leverage is mainly driven by the 
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relative reduction in short-term leverage (column (3), Foreci*Tunnelt =-0.428***). This result 
suggests that before the “tunneling reforms”, listed firms over-borrowed at short maturities to 
provide inter-corporate loans to their controlling shareholders, allowing them to expropriate 
funds from the company. After the “tunneling reforms”, firms prone to tunneling reduced 
disproportionally more their short-term leverage. On the other hand, long-term leverage 
increased relatively more for firms prone to tunneling risks, as suggested by the positive 
interaction term in column (2) (Foreci*Tunnelt =0.164***). Taken together, these results 
suggest that firms which were more prone to tunneling activities before the reforms changed 
their debt structure after these reforms, reducing their short-term leverage while increasing 
their long-term leverage. Hence, our findings suggest the reforms starting in 2005 seem to have 
effectively reduced tunneling activities in China, echoing the results reported in Li et al. (2015). 
More importantly for our analysis, controlling for the differential effects of the “tunneling 
reforms” does not affect the coefficients on Highmovi*Aftert for all debt measures, rejecting 
the alternative explanation that our baseline results are driven by these reforms.  
 
5.2.2. Split-share reform  
The split-share reform initiated in April 2005 mandated the conversion of previously non-
tradable shares into tradable shares, which according to many observers improved corporate 
governance of listed firms (e.g. Chen et al. 2012), promoted further privatization (e.g. Liao, 
Liu and Wang, 2014), and changed the role of secondary equity markets (Campello, Ribas and 
Wang, 2014). These studies also find that the split-share reform promoted access to finance and 
investment, and generated marked improvements in firms’ productivity, profitability and 
employment. Therefore, it is important to check if our results are driven by the split-share 
reform instead of the introduction of the Property Law.  
To this end, the baseline model is augmented with Splitit and Highmovi*Splitit, where 
Splitit is a dummy variable that equals one for firm-year observations after a firm’s completion 
of the split-share reform, and zero otherwise. Results are reported in Table 6, columns (4)-(6). 
The coefficients on Highmovi*Splitit are statistically insignificant for all dependent variables, 
implying that there was no differential impact of the split-share reform on corporate leverage. 
More importantly, the coefficients on Highmovi*Aftert are very similar to the baseline results, 
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suggesting that the effects driven by the introduction of the Property Law were independent 
from those generated by the split-share reform.  
 
5.2.3. Corporate tax reform  
On March 16, 2007, the Enterprise Income Tax Law was enacted and took effect from January 
1th, 2008. Earlier, corporate tax rates varied with firm ownership, with foreign firms enjoying 
a preferential tax rate of 25%, while domestic firms were charged at 33%. The new law 
equalized the tax rates of domestic and foreign firms at 25%. Assuming that lower taxes 
improve firm profitability and consequently their repayment capacity, creditors may extend 
more credit to firms that enjoy larger tax reductions, i.e. domestic firms. Hypothetically, if firms 
with more movable assets were over-represented by domestic firms and if firms with less 
movable assets were mostly foreign firms, our results could be explained by the corporate tax 
reform. To remove this concern, the baseline model is re-estimated for a sample of domestic 
firms, which benefitted equally from the tax reduction, and consequently, the direct effect of 
the tax reform on the outcome variables should be cancelled out in a difference-in-differences 
framework. A firm is classified as domestic if the controlling shareholder is a domestic entity. 
The results reported in columns (7)-(9) of Table 6 are similar to the baseline model results, 
hence our results still hold.  
 
5.3. Credit conditions, financial crisis and collateral value 
Macroeconomic shocks which occurred in the post-reform period could have triggered the 
contrasting behaviors of treated and control firms. This section investigates the following 
possible shocks: a variation in credit conditions; the RMB 4 trillion stimulus package 
implemented during 2008-2010; the 2008 financial crisis; and changes in collateral values such 
as land prices.  
 
5.3.1. Credit conditions  
A concern is that the differential effects on high and low movable firms may reflect the 
asymmetric responses of firms in the treatment and control groups to changing macroeconomic 
credit conditions rather than to the introduction of the Property Law. It has been long 
established that financially constrained firms react to changes in credit conditions more 
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strongly than unconstrained firms (Campello, Graham and Harvey, 2010). Under the 
assumption that high moveable firms are more likely to be financially constrained, these 
differential changes could be caused by variations in credit conditions instead of the 
introduction of the Property Law.  
To investigate this possibility, we expand specification (1) with an interaction term 
between Highmovi and a proxy of credit conditions, which controls for the possibility that high 
movable firms respond to changes in credit conditions differently from low movable firms. We 
employ lagged loan to GDP ratio (LoantoGDPt-1) as a proxy of aggregate credit conditions. 22 
Data are obtained from the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. Columns (1) to (3) of Table 
7 find insignificant coefficients on Highmovi*LoantoGDPt-1 for all leverage measures, which 
                                                             
22 Alternative proxy such as lagged M2/GDP produces similar results, which are available upon request. 
implies that high movable firms do not respond to changes in credit conditions differently from 
low movable firms. The interaction term Highmovi*Aftert, if anything is now statistically and 
economically even more significant than our earlier results from the baseline model. We 
therefore conclude that the differential effects of the Property Law on high movable versus low 
movable firms are independent from changes in credit conditions. 
 
5.3.2. Stimulus package  
From November 2008 to the last quarter of 2010, China implemented a RMB 4 trillion stimulus 
package to mitigate the effects from the global financial crisis, which could affect our results 
if high movable firms received disproportionally more credit thanks to government initiated 
programs under this package. Table 7, columns (4)-(6), include an interaction term 
Highmovi*Stimut to capture the differential effects of the stimulus package on high versus low 
movable firms, where Stimut is a dummy variable that equals one for the period 2008-2010, 
and zero otherwise. The coefficients on Highmovi*Aftert become even more significant, both 
statistically and economically compared to the baseline results in Table 2.  
 
5.3.3. Financial crisis  
The 2008 financial crisis could post also another challenge. Lenders may prefer relatively 
liquid firms during crisis periods and hence may extend disproportionally more credit to firms 
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with more movable assets. To address this issue, we check if our results still hold for a sample 
that ends in 2007, one year before the outbreak of the global financial crisis.23 Results are 
reported in columns (7)-(9). The main findings for this sample are largely similar to the results 
for the whole sample, validating that our previous findings are not driven by financial crisis.  
                                                             
23 Another way to address this is to estimate the model for another crisis period before the enactment of the Property Law. 
Finding results consistent with previously reported would attribute the observed differential effects to financial crisis instead 
of the Property Law. The 1998 East Asian Financial Crisis could have fitted for such a placebo test. Unfortunately, the key 
variable movable assets ratio cannot be computed for years before 2000 when most of the firms do not report their level of 
movable assets. 
 
5.3.4. Impact of macroeconomic shocks on fixed assets value  
Falling asset prices reduce collateral values and debt capacity (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). 
Therefore, the relative increase in leverage for high movable firms, which likely to have low 
levels of fixed assets, could be explained by macroeconomic shocks that reduce the value of 
fixed assets. This hypothesis is unlikely to explain our findings for several reasons. Firstly, any 
time-varying industry or provincial shocks are controlled for because all specifications include 
both the interaction terms Industry*Year and Province*Year. As a result, only shocks that have 
differential impacts on the fixed assets’ value of treated and control firms within the same 
industry and within the same province are of concern. It is very hard to identify such shocks. 
Secondly, the value of the most common type of fixed assets, which is land, has been increasing 
steadily during the sample period (see e.g. Wu, Gyourko and Deng, 2015). If anything, the 
collateral value channel would suggest that firms with more fixed assets should have had better 
access to external finance, which we find not to be the case.24 Lastly, the differential effects of 
the Property Law are strong for a sample of state-owned firms only (Table 5, columns (10)-
(12)), which are less financially constrained (Allen, Qian and Qian, 2005; Ayyagari, Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 2010) and hence changes in collateral values should not affect their 
access to external finance (Wu, Gyourko and Deng, 2015). Taken together, it seems highly 
unlikely that changes in the values of fixed assets are able to explain our findings.   
 
24 Wu, Gyourko and Deng (2015) construct a land price panel across 35 Chinese cities over 2003 to 2011, and report that the 
real value of land doubled for 27 cities, while even quadrupling for nine cities by the end of 2011. They further report that the 
changing values of land do not affect firms’ external finance or investments.  
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5.4. Further robustness tests  
5.4.1. Observables  
This section investigates if our findings are driven by differences in observables other than the 
movable ratio. Specifically, we control explicitly for the differential reactions to the 
introduction of the Property Law as a function of pre-reform firm characteristics Z, which 
includes Tangibility, Liquidity, Age, Profitability, Sale and Leverage. The baseline model is 
augmented with an interaction term FZi*Aftert to capture the differential reactions of other 
innate firm features to the legal change, where FZi is a continuous measure equals the firm’s 
pre-reform median firm characteristic Z. For the sake of brevity, only the results controlling for 
Liquidity, Leverage and Profitability are reported in Table 8. 25  The coefficients on 
Highmovi*Aftert when Debtt/Assett-1 is the dependent variable range from 0.049 to 0.08, and 
all are significant at 1%. For LongDebtt/Assett-1, the coefficients on Highmovi*Aftert center 
around 0.048, and all are significant at 1%. In line with our previous results, we do not find 
differential effects on high versus low movable firms for ShortDebtt/Assett-1 across all 
specifications. Importantly, these results still hold when controlling for pre-reform leverage 
(columns (4)-(6)), suggesting that our findings cannot be explained by mean reversal of debt 
usage. Taken together, these results validate our finding that the movability of assets drives the 
differential effects between high and low movable firms, instead of other innate firm features.  
 
5.4.2. Other robustness tests 
Finally, some additional robustness tests are available upon request, including 1) Re-estimation 
based on continuous measures of treatment, defined as the pre-reform median movable assets 
ratio, or movable assets ratio measured in 2005 (i.e. one year before the reform); 2) 
Reclassification of movable assets: although accounts receivable and inventory are the main 
categories of movable assets, there are other asset types that became pledgable after the reform, 
including for instance, future equipment and raw materials. We therefore broaden the definition 
of movable assets class by defining the movable ratio as (CurrentAssett-Casht)/Assett. 3) Re-
estimation over alternative samples: a) sample of firms that have been listed throughout the 
entire sample period, to alleviate the concern that differential reputational improvements due 
                                                             
25  Including all pre-reform characteristics altogether in one regression also does not exert meaningful changes to the 
coefficients on Highmovi*Aftert. All these results are available from the author upon request.  
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to listing or accessibility to capital markets might drive the results;26 b) a sample of firms that 
never changed their ownership type throughout the sample period, which removes possible 
confounding effects due to privatization. In all these tests, the DID coefficients for all 
dependent variables are remarkably stable and are consistent with our main results. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The Property Law was a milestone in reforming the protection of property and creditor rights 
in China. It also transformed the landscape of secured transactions in China, although this 
aspect of the Property Law has received little academic attention. This study provides the first 
evidence for China that the expansion of permissible collateral improved the access to external 
finance and prolonged the maturity of debt. However, the reform did not improve the efficiency 
of credit allocation among Chinese firms. We find that the extra credit that became available 
due to the legal reform was mostly taken by firms that were less profitable, highly indebted, 
and prone to bankruptcy. This finding is in line with the literature on the allocation efficiency 
of credit expansion (e.g. Mian and Sufi, 2009; Assuncao, Benmelech and Silva, 2014). The 
Property Law reform also allowed firms to invest more in fixed assets. However, we do not 
find evidence that firms improved their performances after the Property Law.  
Taken together, this paper shows that legal reform that expands permissible collateral 
improves the access of firms to external financing. Our results provide important implications 
for policy. Firstly, collateral reform may decrease banks’ screening incentives and allow riskier 
borrowers to obtain extra credit, and consequently risks to financial stability may develop (e.g. 
Manove, Padilla and Pagano 2001; Zazzaro, 2005; Jappelli, Pagano and Bianco, 2005). In 
recent years, non-performing loans in China have increased significantly, which may be 
associated to some extent with an inefficient allocation of credit. Secondly, the availability of 
                                                             
26 All firms in the sample are eventually listed at stock exchanges, but their annual reports started to be published several 
years before the actual listings.  
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more credit driven by an expansion of permissible collateral also may have caused higher 
leverage or overinvestment, with potential detrimental effects on firm profitability and overall 
economic performance. These concerns highlight the importance of accompanying collateral 
law reform with other structural reforms to improve the overall efficiency of credit allocation. 
For instance bank competition and privatization of bank ownership should be promoted in order 
to ensure that lending decisions will be made on commercial grounds.   
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for main variables. Sample covers 2001 to 2011 and excludes observations 
from 2006. The sample contains firms listed in either Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
Data is obtained from Wind Information. Movratiot is defined as (Inventoryt+Accounts receivablest)/Assett. 
Tangibilityt is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets (FixedAssett/Assett). Liquidityt is cash divided by total assets 
(Casht/Assett). Profitabilityt is the ratio of net profits over total assets (Netprofitt/Assett). Salet is the logarithm of 
one plus total sale. Aget is defined as the logarithm of one plus the number of years since incorporation. Listt is a 
dummy variable equals one for firm-year observation after firm’s IPO, and zero otherwise. Splitt is a dummy 
variable equals one for firm-year observation after firm’s completion of the split-share reform, and zero otherwise. 
Statet is a dummy variable equals one if the controlling shareholder is government and zero if the controlling 
shareholder is private entity.  
 
VARIABLES Observations Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Panel A:Movable ratio 
Movratiot 12445 0.26 0.17 0.01 0.76 
Inventoryt/Assett 12570 0.17 0.15 0.00 0.75 
AccountReceivablet/Assett 12518 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.37 
OtherReceivablet/Assett 12692 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.38 
(CurrentAssett-Casht)/Assett 12707 0.37 0.19 0.02 0.86 
Panel B:Debt 
Debtt/Assett-1 6884 0.33 0.22 0.02 1.44 
LongDebtt/ Assett-1 7239 0.12 0.14 0.00 0.79 
ShortDebtt/Assett-1 10218 0.19 0.15 0.00 0.83 
Panel C:Assets and profitability 
Log(1+Assett) 12720 21.25 1.17 18.42 24.70 
FixedAssett/Assett-1 11415 0.32 0.22 0.00 1.07 
Netprofitt/Assett-1 11446 0.04 0.08 -0.28 0.34 
Panel D: Controls 
Tangibilityt 12680 0.29 0.19 0.00 0.79 
Liquidityt 12707 0.16 0.12 0.00 0.56 
Profitabilityt 12717 0.03 0.08 -0.41 0.22 
Salet 12701 20.57 1.50 15.94 24.50 
Aget 12720 2.43 0.49 0.00 4.13 
Listt 12720 0.96 0.20 0 1 
Splitt 12720 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Statet 12710 0.69 0.46 0 1 
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Table 2: Debt structure 
This table estimates the following specification:??? ? ?? ? ?? ? ????????? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ???, where i indexes 
for firm and t for year. The dependent variables are Debtt/Assett-1 (DT/TA), LongDebtt/Assett-1 (LD/TA), and 
ShortDebtt/Assett-1 (SD/TA), respectively. α?  and γ?  are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. Aftert is a 
dummy variable equals one for the years 2007-2011, and zero otherwise. Highmovi equals one if i’s pre-reform 
median movable ratio belongs to the top tertile, and zero if in the bottom tertile. X is a set of firm specific control 
variables and ε?? is error term. Columns (4)-(9) report results for placebo reforms takes place in 2003 and 2004, 
respectively. For these placebo reforms, the sample ends by year-end of 2005. In these placebo regressions, Aftert 
is an indicator variable that takes value one for years after the placebo reform, and Highmovi is measured over 
years before the each placebo reform. Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Actual Reform Placebo 2003 Placebo 2004 
Dep.Var. DT/TA LD/TA SD/TA DT/TA LD/TA SD/TA DT/TA LD/TA SD/TA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Highmovi*Aftert 0.069*** 0.048*** 0.009 -0.027 -0.006 -0.014 0.023 0.024 -0.010 
 (0.024) (0.014) (0.012) (0.021) (0.013) (0.011) (0.020) (0.018) (0.010) 
Log(TAt-1) -0.106*** -0.033*** -0.040*** -0.222*** -0.070*** -0.092*** -0.220*** -0.070*** -0.095*** 
 (0.016) (0.009) (0.007) (0.030) (0.018) (0.015) (0.031) (0.018) (0.015) 
Tangibilityt-1 -0.128*** -0.073*** -0.035 -0.190*** -0.088* -0.045 -0.155** -0.099** -0.019 
 (0.046) (0.028) (0.023) (0.073) (0.045) (0.037) (0.075) (0.046) (0.038) 
Liquidityt-1 -0.098 -0.068* -0.042 -0.041 -0.068* -0.025 -0.044 -0.071* -0.019 
 (0.060) (0.036) (0.028) (0.076) (0.041) (0.038) (0.078) (0.041) (0.038) 
Profitabilityt-1 -0.131 0.066 -0.156*** -0.126 0.060 -0.101** -0.114 0.064 -0.098** 
 (0.085) (0.046) (0.044) (0.096) (0.052) (0.048) (0.099) (0.051) (0.048) 
Salet-1 -0.002 -0.017** 0.009* 0.004 -0.010 0.011 0.003 -0.001 0.007 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.021) (0.011) (0.007) (0.020) (0.010) (0.007) 
Aget-1 0.124*** 0.038 0.039* 0.144** 0.017 0.078*** 0.120** -0.003 0.060** 
 (0.043) (0.023) (0.024) (0.057) (0.039) (0.029) (0.055) (0.040) (0.029) 
Listt -0.013 -0.036* 0.005 0.035 -0.016 0.007 0.026 -0.017 0.009 
 (0.032) (0.019) (0.014) (0.040) (0.026) (0.015) (0.038) (0.025) (0.014) 
Splitt 0.034* 0.031** 0.006 0.042 0.012 0.004 0.037 0.008 0.001 
 (0.020) (0.012) (0.010) (0.028) (0.017) (0.013) (0.029) (0.017) (0.013) 
Statet -0.025 -0.007 -0.010 -0.029 0.006 -0.004 -0.015 0.001 0.007 
 (0.024) (0.015) (0.012) (0.038) (0.019) (0.017) (0.039) (0.022) (0.017) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,559 4,835 6,658 2,018 2,098 3,070 2,013 2,089 3,063 
R-squared 0.268 0.231 0.237 0.280 0.208 0.190 0.286 0.209 0.214 
Number of firms 750 761 835 657 671 818 658 671 818 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 41 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1750
Table 3: The efficiency of credit allocation 
This table presents subsample estimations using the following specification: ??? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?????????? ??????? ? ????? ? ?????????? ? ?????? ? ??????? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ???, where i indexes for firms and t for year. 
PreQi is a set of continuous proxies of pre-reform firm quality, including: return on sales (ROS), indebtedness 
(Liability Ratio), and Altman’s Z-score. Each proxy is measured at the pre-reform median. The dependent variable 
is Debtt/Assett-1 (DT/TA). α? and γ? are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. Aftert is a dummy variable 
equals one for the years 2007-2011, and zero otherwise. Highmovi equals one if i’s pre-reform median movable 
ratio belongs to the top tertile, and zero if in the bottom tertile. X is a set of firm specific control variables and ε?? 
is error term. All specifications include firm specific control variables, firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, 
Industry*Year fixed effects, and Province*Year fixed effects. ε?? is error term. Standard errors clustered at firm 
level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Dep.Var. DT/TA 
PreQi= ROS Liability Z-score 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Highmovi*Aftert *PreQi -0.191* 0.348*** -0.011* 
 (0.113) (0.112) (0.006) 
Highmovi*Aftert 0.074*** -0.105 0.102*** 
 (0.024) (0.065) (0.031) 
Aftert *PreQi 0.147*** -0.499*** 0.015*** 
 (0.056) (0.078) (0.005) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Year Yes Yes Yes 
Province*Year Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,559 4,559 4,559 
R-squared 0.270 0.288 0.276 
Number of firms 750 750 750 
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Table 4: Asset structure and profitability 
This table estimates the following specification:???? ? ?? ? ?? ? ????????? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ???, where i indexes 
for firms and t for year. The dependent variables are Log(1+Assetit) (LogTA), FixedAssetit/Assetit-1 (FA/TA), and 
Profitit/Assetit-1 (Profit/TA), respectively. α? and γ? are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. In column (1)-
(3), Aftert is a dummy variable equals one for the years 2007-2011, and zero otherwise; and Highmovi equals one 
if i’s pre-reform median movable ratio belongs to the top tertile, and zero if in the bottom tertile. X is a set of firm 
specific control variables and ε??? is error term. Columns (4)-(9) report results for placebo reforms took place in 
2003 and 2004, respectively. In these placebo regressions, Aftert is an indicator variable that takes value one for 
years after the placebo reform, and Highmovi is measured over years before the each placebo reform. The sample 
ends by year-end of 2005 for these placebo reforms. Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Actual Reform Placebo 2003 Placebo 2004 
Dep. Var. LogTA FA/TA Profit/TA LogTA FA/TA Profit/TA LogTA FA/TA Profit/TA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Highmovi*Aftert 0.123** 0.076*** 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.021 0.005 0.004 
 (0.049) (0.013) (0.006) (0.023) (0.012) (0.006) (0.024) (0.016) (0.006) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,585 7,574 7,579 3,363 3,362 3,362 3,366 3,365 3,367 
R-squared 0.604 0.218 0.263 0.551 0.157 0.272 0.545 0.156 0.272 
Number of firms 844 844 844 842 842 842 843 843 843 
Table 5: Creditor rights and property rights protection  
Columns (1)-(9) estimate the following:??? ? ?? ? ?? ? ????????? ? ?????? ? ???????????? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ???, 
where i indexes for firms, j for industries, and t for year. The dependent variables are Debtt/Assett-1 (DT/TA), 
LongDebtt/Assett-1 (LD/TA), and ShortDebtt/Assett-1 (SD/TA), respectively. α? and γ? are firm and year fixed 
effects, respectively. ??? is error term. Aftert is a dummy variable equals one for the years 2007-2011, and zero 
otherwise. Highmovi equals one if i’s pre-reform median movable ratio belongs to the top tertile, and zero if in the 
bottom tertile. Protection is represented by Ftani, Privateit, or Protecti, respectively. Ftani is a continuous variable 
equals to firm’s pre-reform median FixedAsset/Asset ratio. Privateit is a dummy equals one if firm i’s controlling 
shareholder at time t is a private entity, and zero otherwise. Protecti is a continuous variable that equals the pre-
reform median producer protection index of the province where the firm i locates. Columns (10)-(12) estimate 
specification (1) for a sample of state-owned firms. All specifications include firm specific control variables, firm 
fixed effects, year fixed effects, Industry*Year fixed effects, and Province*Year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at firm level, except in columns (7)-(9) are clustered at province level. ***, **, and * implies significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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 Creditor Rights Firm Property Rights Regional Property Rights State-Owned Firms 
Dep.Var. DT/TA LD/TA SD/TA DT/TA LD/TA SD/TA DT/TA LD/TA SD/TA DT/TA LD/TA SD/TA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Highmovi*Aftert 0.060** 0.026* 0.019 0.071*** 0.047*** 0.008 0.066*** 0.053*** 0.008 0.083*** 0.052*** 0.008 
 (0.026) (0.016) (0.017) (0.024) (0.014) (0.012) (0.025) (0.014) (0.012) (0.029) (0.017) (0.014) 
Ftani*Aftert -0.056 -0.128*** 0.119***          
 (0.078) (0.046) (0.038)          
Privateit*Aftert    -0.039 0.022 -0.042***       
    (0.026) (0.015) (0.013)       
Protecti*Aftert       -0.001 -0.002 -0.001    
       (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)    
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,559 4,835 6,658 4,559 4,835 6,658 4,278 4,547 6,261 3,464 3,643 4,800 
R-squared 0.268 0.235 0.241 0.270 0.232 0.242 0.209 0.181 0.190 0.289 0.262 0.261 
Number of firms 750 761 835 750 761 835 707 718 787 596 603 674 
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Table 6: Other contemporary reforms  
This table estimates the differential effects of other reforms. The dependent variables are Debtt/Assett-1 (DT/TA), 
LongDebtt/Assett-1 (LD/TA), and ShortDebtt/Assett-1 (SD/TA), respectively. Tunnel Reform columns (columns (1) 
to (3)) estimate the following: ??? ? ?? ? ?? ? ????????? ? ?????? ? ???????? ? ??????? ? ?? ? ???  In this 
specification, Highmovi equals one if i’s pre-reform median movable ratio belongs to the top tertile, and zero if in 
the bottom tertile. Foreci is a continuous measure equals to firm i´s median level of other receivables to assets 
ratio (Other Receivables/Asset), measured for the pre-tunneling reform (2001-2004) period. Tunnelt is a dummy 
equals one for years from 2005 to 2011, and zero otherwise. Split-Share Reform (columns (4) to (6)) estimate:??? ?
?? ? ?? ? ????????? ? ?????? ? ?????????? ? ??????? ? ????????? ? ?? ? ???. In this specification, Splitit equals 
one for firm-year observations after firm’s completion of split-share reform, and zero otherwise. Tax Reform 
columns (columns (7) to (9)) estimate specification (1) for a sample of domestic firms. In all specifications, i 
indexes firms and t indexes year. α? and γ? are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. Aftert is a dummy 
variable that equals one for the years 2007-2011, and zero otherwise. All specifications include firm specific 
control variables, firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, Industry*Year fixed effects, and Province*Year fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 Tunnel Reform Split-Share Reform Tax Reform 
Dep.Var. DT/TA LD/TA SD/TA DT/TA LD/TA SD/TA DT/TA LD/TA SD/TA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Highmovi*Aftert 0.069*** 0.048*** 0.006 0.067* 0.057*** 0.011 0.070*** 0.052*** 0.005 
 (0.024) (0.014) (0.012) (0.042) (0.022) (0.019) (0.024) (0.015) (0.012) 
Foreci*Tunnelt -0.311* 0.164* -0.428***       
 (0.175) (0.098) (0.085)       
Highmovi*Splitit    0.002 -0.010 -0.002    
    (0.041) (0.022) (0.019)    
Splitit    0.033 0.035* 0.007    
    (0.028) (0.019) (0.013)    
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,559 4,835 6,658 4,559 4,835 6,658 4,400 4,662 6,411 
R-squared 0.269 0.232 0.248 0.268 0.231 0.237 0.274 0.231 0.237 
Number of firms 750 761 835 750 761 835 741 753 832 
Table 7: Macroeconomic shocks 
Columns (1)-(6) estimate the following specification: ??? ? ?? ? ?? ? ????????? ? ?????? ? ?????????? ?
????? ? ?? ? ???, where i indexes for firms and t for year. The dependent variables are Debtt/Assett-1 (DT/TA), 
LongDebtt/Assett-1 (LD/TA), and ShortDebtt/Assett-1 (SD/TA), respectively. α? and γ? are firm and year fixed 
effects, respectively. ??? is error term. Aftert is a dummy variable that equals one for the years 2007-2011, and 
zero otherwise. Highmovi equals one if i’s pre-reform median movable ratio belongs to the top tertile, and zero if 
in the bottom tertile. Shock is represented by LoantoGDPt-1 (columns (1) to (3)) or Stimut (columns (4) to (6)), 
where LoantoGDPt-1 is lagged loan to GDP ratio and Stimut is a dummy variable that takes on value one for years 
2008 to 2010 and zero otherwise. Columns (7) to (9) estimate specification (1) for a pre-crisis sample (2001-2007). 
All specifications include firm specific control variables, firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, Industry*Year fixed 
effects, and Province*Year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * implies 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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 Credit Condition Stimulus Package Pre-Crisis 
Dep.Var. DT/TA LD/TA SD/TA DT/TA LD/TA SD/TA DT/TA LD/TA SD/TA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Highmovi*Aftert 0.073*** 0.053*** 0.011 0.089*** 0.059*** 0.021 0.072** 0.039* 0.013 
 (0.026) (0.015) (0.013) (0.028) (0.016) (0.014) (0.036) (0.022) (0.016) 
Highmovi*LoantoGDPt-1 0.038 0.044 0.022       
 (0.063) (0.039) (0.030)       
Highmovi*Stimut    -0.036* -0.020 -0.020**    
    (0.020) (0.013) (0.009)    
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,559 4,835 6,658 4,559 4,835 6,658 2,535 2,642 3,826 
R-squared 0.268 0.231 0.237 0.269 0.231 0.238 0.243 0.195 0.177 
Number of firms 750 761 835 750 761 835 694 708 826 
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Table 8: Observables 
This table estimates the following specification:??? ? ?? ? ?? ? ????????? ? ?????? ? ????? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ???, 
where i indexes for firms and t for year. The dependent variables are Debtt/Assett-1 (DT/TA), LongDebtt/Assett-1 
(LD/TA), and ShortDebtt/Assett-1 (SD/TA), respectively. α? and γ? are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. ??? is error term. Aftert is a dummy variable that equals one for the years 2007-2011, and zero otherwise. Highmovi 
equals one if i’s pre-reform median movable ratio belongs to the top tertile, and zero if in the bottom tertile. FZi 
is pre-reform median value of firm characteristic Z, including pre-liquidity (Fcashi), pre-leverage (Flevi), and pre-
profitability (Fpfti), respectively. All specifications include firm specific control variables, firm fixed effects, year 
fixed effects, Industry*Year fixed effects, and Province*Year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm 
level. ***, **, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Pre-Liquidity Pre-Leverage Pre-Profitability 
Dep. Var.  DT/TA LD/TA SD/TA DT/TA LD/TA SD/TA DT/TA LD/TA SD/TA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Highmovi*Aftert 0.068*** 0.048*** 0.010 0.049** 0.041*** -0.001 0.080*** 0.049*** 0.011 
 (0.024) (0.014) (0.012) (0.022) (0.014) (0.012) (0.024) (0.015) (0.013) 
Fcashi*Aftert 0.413*** 0.220*** 0.096       
 (0.148) (0.080) (0.062)       
Flevi*Aftert    -0.758*** -0.279*** -0.431***    
    (0.081) (0.052) (0.048)    
Fpfti*Aftert       1.192*** 0.106 0.550*** 
       (0.265) (0.154) (0.174) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,559 4,835 6,658 4,342 4,563 5,703 4,559 4,835 6,658 
R-squared 0.272 0.234 0.238 0.309 0.247 0.294 0.275 0.231 0.246 
Number of firms 750 761 835 677 677 692 750 761 835 
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